ABSTRACT As wireless communication technology and semiconductor technology developed fast, the wireless medical sensor networks (WMSNs) have been applied to the modern health-care area at large. The physiological data can be obtained by medical sensor nodes deployed in the patient's body and sent to the special devices of the health professionals through wireless communication. Thus, the status of a patient is monitored by the health professional in that way. However, there are still two important issues that how to guarantee secure communication and protect the privacy of the patient for the reason of the open feature of wireless communication. In this paper, initially, an improved three-factor user authentication scheme is proposed to overcome those flaws utilizing password, smart card, and biometric feature. Furthermore, formal security analysis shows that the proposed scheme defends against various security pitfalls. Finally, the comparison results with other surviving relevant schemes show that our scheme is more efficient in terms of computational cost, communication cost, and estimated time. Therefore, the proposed scheme is suitable for practical application in WMSN.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet of Things (IOT) technology developed, great success that [1] wireless communication technology has become more and more mature has been achieved by chip and sensor. Comprehensive application based on these technologies is applied to promote the rapid development of the entire Internet of Things, thus resulting in sensor nodes in WSN being deployed in many application areas to obtain the monitoring data for specified monitoring district. In recent years, as an important application branch of WSN, more and more attention has been drawn to the wireless medical sensor networks (WMSN) in the field of medical monitoring, WMSN has great potential for enhancing the quality of medical services. As shown in FIGURE 1, a WMSN comprises many lightweight devices with limited memory, limited bandwidth
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Theofanis P. Raptis. and limited computing power. Initially, many medical sensors are fixed on patients' body to monitor closely the physiological information of patient. Furthermore, patient's vital physiological data is obtained by those sensors, for example temperature, hearts beats, pluse-oximetry and blood pressure etc. Finally, those data will be transmitted to the health professional, afterwards the physiological information is utilized to give some appropriate advices for the patient's health status by the experienced doctors. Hence, the patients are benefited from continuous long-term monitoring anytime or anywhere [2] , [3] .
However, once the patient's physical data is leaked, the privacy of the patient is impaired. If the patient's physiological information received by the attending physician is maliciously tampered, wrong diagnosis will be given by the doctor. Furthermore the medical accidents may be caused. Therefore, it is vitally significant to design a security and strong authentication schemes for WMSN, considering that FIGURE 1. Health-care application using wireless medical sensor networks [2] .
all kinds of restricted conditions for WMSN and patient's privacy are safe.
Many authentication schemes for WMSN have been proposed for medical applications. Here, a briefly review is made about some typical authentication protocols in the following description. Le et al. [4] A mutual authentication is designed and control protocol is accessed for WMSN in 2011 by Le et al. [4] , the ECC was utilized to cope with security and privacy problems. Unfortunately, the patient's privacy cannot be protected well by their proposed scheme on account of that the vital signs of patient can be revealed to the other users by malicious. An ECC-based authentication protocol on WMSN is proposed by Yeh et al. [5] too. That Yeh et al. [5] scheme cannot provide mutual authentication was pointed by Hsiu et al. [5] in the same year later. To solve these problems which were indicated by Hsiu et al. [5] , ECC is still utilized by Shi et al. [6] to construct a new user authentication protocol for WSN in 2013, since ECC increases computational complexity, in addition extra storage for nodes and users' public keys is required. Therefore they aren't suitable for health-care applications in WMSN. An efficient and strong authentication protocol for healthcare applications using wireless medical sensor networks are proposed by Kumar et al. [7] . However, that Kumar et al. [7] protocol is vulnerable to some attacks, is proposed by He et al. [8] (for instance off-line password guessing attack and privileged insider attack etc.).Furthermore an improved scheme is proposed by them for solving the faults of Kumar et al.'s scheme [7] in 2015. In the same year, that He et al.'s scheme [8] is insecure against various attacks is pointed out by Mir et al. [9] , for instance forward secrecy attack and masquerading user attack etc.. An efficient anonymous authentication protocol for WMSN was proposed to resist those attacks. That He et al.'s scheme [8] has many shortcomings (for example without wrong password detection mechanism etc.),is demonstrated by Li et al. [3] , therefore a new protocol is designed to enhance the security and the computation efficiency is kept by them. An advanced biometric-based user authentication scheme for WSN is designed by Yoon and Kim [10] . Furthermore, the characteristic of their scheme used only secure one-way hash function and the user password isn't required. Therefore, Yoon's scheme is more efficient and convenient in comparison with other related traditional authentication schemes. That scheme of reference [6] is vulnerable to stolen smart card attack, is pointed out by Yoon and Kim [10] . Besides, a security enhanced user authentication protocol for WSN using ECC in 2014 was provided by them. That Yoon's scheme [10] has various security faults is demonstrated by Choi et al. [12] , for instance biological recognition errors, user verification problems, user anonymity deficiency, denial-of-service attacks and session key exposure etc. To solve those security problems, an improved biometric-based user authentication scheme was proposed by Choi et al. [12] . In 2016, Park et al. [13] founded that Choi et al.'s scheme [11] could not resist user impersonation attack Hence an enhanced biometricbased authentication scheme is proposed by them for WSN to overcome that security fault. That Park et al.'s scheme [13] could not resist user impersonation attack etc., is demonstrated by Moon et al. [14] , furthermore, an improved biometric-based authentication protocol for WSN was proposed in 2017.
A real-time remote monitoring of patients in telemedicine with related ''big data'' is presented by Kalid et al. [16] in 2018. Next year, [17] An sensor-Based mHealth Authentication for Real-Time Remote Healthcare Monitoring System is proposed by Alrufaye M et al.. For Reference [16] , [17] , they all have patient privacy information security risks.
As aforementioned schemes, considering the special intrinsic characteristic of WSN, the ECC/AES algorithms used by the relative reference [4] - [6] , [13] are unsuitable to be applied in WSN. Therefore, a scheme to overcome those flaws is proposed by Alrufaye M et al.. Unfortunately, their scheme could not withstand masquerading user attack, forward secrecy, password guessing attack and time synchronization problem yet. In this paper, a more efficient user authentication scheme is proposed to extend the lifetime of WSN by taking advantage of the merits of He et al.'s protocol. Furthermore, there are many advantages of biometric key, in addition, some of the main advantages are described as follows:
1) Forgetting and losing biometric key is impossible; 2) Copying and sharing biometric key is difficult; 3) Forging and distributing biometric key is difficult extremely; 4) Guessing biometric key is difficult; 5) Cracking biometric key is more difficult than traditional password.
The rest of the parts of this paper are arranged as follows. Preliminaries used in this paper are described in Section 2. Furthermore, scheme is enhanced by us and the VOLUME 7, 2019 corresponding security analysis is shown in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively, Security feature and performance comparison with other surviving relevant schemes are described in Section 5. Some conclusions are proposed in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, some useful basic knowledge about fuzzy extractor and related assumptions are briefly introduced as follows.
A. FUZZY EXTRACTOR
The biometric-based fuzzy extractor [12] - [15] converts biometric data into a randomly value, which consists of two procedures (Gen, Rep), and they are described as follows:
i is reasonably close to B i . The function Gen is a probabilistic generation procedure, its input is B i , and its output contains an ''extracted'' string R i ∈ {0, 1} l and an auxiliary string P i ∈ {0, 1} * . The function Rep is a deterministic reproduction procedure, which recovery R i is from the corresponding auxiliary string P i . Even if the biometric inputted by user is disturbed by the scanning device, the reasonable similarity status with the original biometric information can be maintained by the retrieved R i for a long time. The request of authentication is satisfied.
B. RELATED ASSUMPTIONS
It is necessary that the following assumptions are made to make a better description and comparison is made with other authentication schemes.
Assumption 1: With regard to the secure one-way hash function y = h(x), it is extremely easy to compute y for a given x, however it is extremely difficult to compute x for a given y.
Assumption 2: The attacker U A has the ability to steal U i s identity and password from the identity table of the gateway in a privileged-insider attack.
Assumption 3 The public communication channel can be monitored by attacker U A among the user U i , the gateway node GWN and the medical sensor node SID j . Furthermore, U A has the ability to eavesdrop, intercept and modify the information transmitted through the public communication channel.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, an improved authentication scheme is proposed for WMSN. The biometric feature key is brought in our protocol as the third authentication factor. To understand the proposed scheme well, the health-care monitoring architecture for WMSN is shown in FIGURE 2.
The proposed scheme contains five phases: health professional registration phase, patient registration phase, user login phase, authentication and key agreement phase, and password update phase. The notations and its description used through the full paper are defined in TABLE 1. 
A. HEALTH PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION PHASE
To become a legal user, the health professional is needed to make a registration at the registration center of the hospital by performing the following steps: 1) Initially her/his identity ID i , password PW i are chosen freely and her/his personal biometric B i on the corresponding extraction < R i , P i >= Gen(B i ). In addition, U i computes the following parameters according to the equation (1):
Finally, U i sends the message {ID i , RBPW i } to gateway in a secure channel.
2) After receiving the message {ID i , RBPW i }, a secure random value r g is generated and computes the following parameters are computed by GW according to the equations (2-4):
device is imprinted by the user U i . Furthermore, B i is utilized to calculate and obtains the biometric key obtained through the means of the fuzzy by U i where X GWN is the secret key of GW. Furthermore, The related parameters
} is stored into the SC and it is sent to U i in a secure channel by GW. In addition, a value {ID i ⊕ h(X GWN r g )} is stored to its own database and the writable protected bit {0/1} is kept by GW where the status-bit indicates the status of U i . For instance, the status-bit is set to 1 if U i logins the WMSN; if not, it is set to 0.
3) When receiving the SC, U i calculates D according to the equation (5):
4) Keys D is inserted into the SC. Therefore, the smart card contains the parameters
The professional registration phase is shown in FIGURE 3.
B. PATIENT REGISTRATIOPN PHASE
For the medical sensor nodes are fixed on the patient, therefore we think the medical sensor nodes can on behalf of the patient. The registration phases of the medical sensor node are described as follows: 1) Initially its identity SID j and a random value r j are chosen by medical sensor node S n freely, furthermore F j = h(SID j r j ) is calculated. Finally, the message {F j , SID j } is sent by S n to gateway in a secure channel.
2) After receiving the message {F j , SID j }, C ig = h(X GWN SID j ) ⊕ F j is calculated and {SID j , F j ⊕ h(SID j r g )} is stored into its own database by GW. Furthermore, the message {C ig } is sent to S n by GW via a secure channel.
3) Upon receiving the message {C ig }, the following parameters are calculated by S n according to the equations (6-7):
Furthermore, {J } is stored into its own database by S n . The medical sensor node of the patient registration phase is shown in FIGURE 4.
C. HEALTH PROFESSIONAL LOGIN PHASE
The physiological data of the patient can be obtained by the health professional U i through the medical sensor nodes. The special process of health professional login phases are described as follows:
1) The SC is inserted into the card reader. Furthermore ID i and PW i are inputed and her/his biometric B * i is imprinted on the corresponding device by U i . VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. Health professional login phase in the proposed scheme.
Furthermore, R i = Rep(B i , P i ) and BPW * i = h(R * i ) are computed by U i through fuzzy extraction method. The following parameters are calculated by the SC according to the equations (8) (9) (10) (11) :
2) Whether the equation h(Q * i ) = h(Q i ) holds is verified by the SC. If it doesn't hold, which means that one of the identity ID i , password PW i or the biometric B i is invalid. Hence the SC will discard the session; if not, U i is a legal user.
3) After U i is confirmed as a legal user, the random value K i is generated and the following parameters are computed by the SC according to the equations (12-13):
where N i is a nonce generated freely by U i . Furthermore, the message {M 1 } will be sent to GW by the SC. The user login phase is shown in FIGURE 5.
D. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
After the login request message {M 1 } is received by GW, the user U i and medical sensor node S n conduct the mutual authentication and key agreement by the following steps: 1) Upon receiving the request message {M 1 }, the ID i through the parameter {ID i ⊕ h(X GWN r g )} stored in its own database is obtained and the following parameters according to the equations (14) (15) are calculated by GW:
2) The nonce N i is obtained and its freshness is checked by GW. If the nonce N i isn't fresh, GW rejects the login request; if not, GW computes V * i = h(ID i K i N i ) and checks whether equation V * i = V i holds or not. If they are equal, GW discards the session; if not, that U i is a legitimate user is ensured by us.
3) The following parameters according to the equations (16-17) is calculated by GW:
where the nonce N g is generated freely by GW. Furthermore, the message {M 2 , N g } is sent to S n by GW. 4) When receiving the message {M 2 , N g }, the medical sensor node S n verifies whether the nonce N g is freshness.
If N g isn't freshness, the authentication request is rejected by S n ; if not, the following parameters are calculated by S n according to the equations (18) (19) :
5) Whether the equation W * = W holds or not is verified by S n . If they aren't equal, S n discards the session; if not, S n generates a random value K j and calculates the following parameters according to the equations (20) (21) (22) (23) :
where the nonce N j is generated freely by S n . Furthermore, the authentication message {M 3 , CSID j , Ack, N j } is sent to U i by S n .
6) Upon receiving the authentication message {M 3 , CSID j , Ack, N j }, whether the nonce N j is freshness is verified by U i . If the nonce N j isn't freshness, U i rejects the authentication request; if not, U i calculates the following parameters according to the equations (24-26):
7) Whether M * 3 = M 3 holds or not is verified by U i . If they aren't equal, U i discards the session; if not, U i ensures that S n and GW are both authenticated.
8) The U i and S n can share a common session key SK = h(ID i SID j K i K j N i ). The authentication and key agreement phase is shown in Figure 6 .
E. PASSWORD UPDATE PHASE
When a health professional U i wants to update her/his password, the procedures should be performed as follows:
1) U i inserts the smart card into a reader card, inputs ID i , PW i and imprints her/his biometric B * * i on the corresponding device. Furthermore, the following parameters are computed by U i according to the equations (27-28):
2) The following parameters according to the equations (29-32) are calculated by SC:
3) The smart card verifies whether the equation h(Q * * i ) = h(Q i ) holds or not. If it doesn't equal, which means that one of the identity ID i, the password PW i or the biometric B i is invalid. Furthermore the SC will discard the session; if not, it confirms the correctness of the identity ID i , the password PW i and the biometric B i of the user U i .
4) A new password PW new i
is chosen and it is inputed into the SC by U i . Afterwards, SC calculates the following parameters according to the equations (33-35):
5) The parameters C ig , h(Q i ) are replaced with C new ig , h(Q new i ) respectively. The password update phase is shown in FIGURE 7.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, the security features and problems of the proposed scheme are discussed.
A. BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION ERROR
In the proposed scheme, biometric recognition error is avoided by using the fuzzy extractor. The scheme proposed by Yoon and Kim [10] used the secure one-way hash function Hash() to determine the accuracy of biometrics. As is known, the secure one-way hash function has a property that the output value will be changed dramatically, as the input data makes slight differences. In a practical application, biometric recognition error occurs inevitably, which leads to the consequences that legitimate user cannot complete the verification of login phase. For this problem, the incorrect identification of the biological characteristics information is overcomed by our scheme, and a good effect is obtained, therefore the biometric recognition error can be resisted by the proposed scheme.
B. RESIST OFF-LINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
Nevertheless the attacker U A can extracts the related parameters {C ig , D, h(Q i ), h(.)}, which are stored in the SC, in addition, can eavesdrop the login request message {M 1 } of the user U i in the public channel. Yet U A still can't guess the right password of the proposed scheme because the secret value X GWN −U is not obtained by U A . Moreover, password guessing is infeasible owing to computational complexity without knowing the user ID i and the biometric key BPW i . Therefore, the proposed scheme resists off-line password guessing attack.
C. RESIST REPLAY ATTACK
Assuming that the attacker U A attempts to impersonate user U i to pass the authentication, which is between GW and medical sensor S n , by replaying previous authentication message. However, her/his purpose can't be achieved by the attacker, because a nonce-based authentication scheme, which makes all authentication request messages differently in different phase, is used by the proposed scheme. For instance, the transmitted message {M 1 } is sent to GW by U i in the login phase. Afterwards, the received message is utilized to recover the nonce N i and checks its freshness by performing the authentication and key agreement phase in our scheme. Therefore, the proposed scheme resists the replay attack.
D. USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Assuming that the parameters stored in the SC can be extracted by the attacker U A in some way (for instance energy analysis attack [16] ). Although a user U i 's SC has been stolen and the login message{M 1 } has been eavesdropped by U A , the authentication still can't be passed by she/he, for U A doesn't know the X GWN −U . In addition, the fake message {M * 1 } can't pass by GW, meanwhile, the fake message {M * 1 } to acquire the information (ID i K i V i N i ) can't be decrypted by GW too. Therefore, the masquerading user attack can be resisted by the proposed scheme. VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 6. Authentication and key agreement phase of our scheme.
E. RESIST ONLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
Supposing that the related parameters {C ig , D, h(Q i ), h(.)} has been obtained by the attacker U A , which stored in the SC, in addition the transmitted message has been intercepted in the authentication and key agreement phase. U A wishes to derive the U i 's password PW i by tracing the transmitted message during the different phases. Nevertheless, the right password of the user U i cannot be guessed out by the attacker U A because the request messages are encrypted by the symmetric encryption algorithm with the secret keys X GWN −U and J . Therefore, the right password can not be guessed out by the attacker U A to make a fake request message.
F. NO TIME SUNCHRONIZATION PROBLEM
As is well known, there are usually two kinds of methods which can be adapted to resist replay attack: timestamp-based and nonce-based. Unfortunately, to avoid the time synchronization problem, the timestamp-based scheme has to confirm that all entities are time synchronization, which will increase the communication traffic among different entities. In this paper, a nonce-based (e.g., N i , N g ) mechanism instead of timestamp is utilized by the proposed scheme utilizes to prevent U A from replaying the previously transmitted message. Therefore, the proposed scheme isn't needed to consider the time synchronization problem.
G. RESIST STOLEN VERIFIED ATTACK
The stolen verifier attack is a typical attack and can bring in serious consequences in the practical network environment. The verifier-tables (e.g., the identity table and password table) is always stolen from the server and the verifier-table is always utilized to carry out some malicious attacks by the attacker U A . In the proposed scheme, the parameter {ID i ⊕ h(X GWN r g )} is stored in verifier-table for every user and which maintained by server of GW. This strategy makes the attacker U A can't acquire the user's ID i , PW i and BPW i . Therefore, the stolen verifier attack can be resisted by the proposed scheme. 
H. RESISTANCE TO THE PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
In practical applications, the same password is utilized by many users to access several different gateways for convenience. Even if the GW is regarded as a dependable entity, it is possible that there is a malicious privileged-insider in GW. If the attacker U A is a privileged-insider in GW, afterwards her/his own jurisdiction may be used to obtain a user's private information (e.g., ID i , PW i ). Furthermore, her/his try to impersonate the user to login otherGW [19] . In the proposed scheme, the password sent by the user U i is not plain-text password PW i nevertheless secret password RBPW i = h(ID i PW i BPW i ) through bringing in the biometric key BPW i . Finally, the user's password isn't obtained by the insider from a registration request message. It can be demonstrated that the insider attack can be resisted by the proposed scheme.
I. AGAINST MULTIPLE USERS LOGGED-IN PROBLEM
Supposing that the identity ID i and password PW i has been obtained by the attacker U A . In addition, the related parameters{C ig , D, h(Q i ), h(.)} stored in the SC are leaked to more than one user [18] , [20] . Nevertheless, a status-bit field is maintained by GW in its own identity table. Furthermore it sets the status-bit to one when user login the GW; if not, the status-bit is set to zero. In addition, each user has different biometric key BPW i , it is also an important reason. Therefore, multiple same users can be resisted to login the gateway simultaneously by the proposed scheme.
J. AGAINST FORWARD SECRECY ATTACK
Based on session key SK = h(ID i SID j K i K j N i ) mentioned above, the session key not only depends on secret key K j of the medical sensor node S n but also needs to know the user identityID i too. Therefore, the session key SK between U i and S n is secure, for the reason that the identity ID i of the user U i is only known to the user U i , even if the attacker U A has comprised the secret key K j of S n . Therefore, forward secrecy attack can be resisted by the proposed scheme.
K. AGAINST DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK
Before the SC computes the login message, the user U i must input her/his identity ID i , the password PW i and imprint her/his own biometric B i . Besides, whether identity ID i , passwordPW i and biometric key BPW i of U i are valid is verified by SC. If they are invalid, SC will discard the session; if not, the following parameters according to the equations (36-39) is calculated by SC:
Furthermore, whether the equation h(Q * i ) = h(Q i ) holds or not is verified by the SC. If it doesn't hold, which means that one of the identity ID i , password PW i and the biometric B i is invalid, the SC will discard the session; if not, the user U i will be considered as a legal one. Finally, a login request message can't be faked by the attacker U A , which is consisted of the wrong identity ID i , the password PW i or the biometric key BPW i . Therefore, denial-of-service attack can be resisted by the proposed scheme. 
L. RESIST TO THE SMART CARD STOLEN ATTACK
After the smart card of the user U i is stolen, it is assumed that the parameters {C ig , h(Q i ), D, h(.)} stored in the smart card can be obtained by the malicious attacker U A . Some malicious attacks can be done by the attacker U A , for instance guessing the real password of the user U i in addition to updating it, or pretending to be a legitimate user. In the solution proposed in this paper, initially, the biometric key of the human body is used as an authentication factor. Besides the user cannot forge or guess during the user login phase. In the equation
, X GWN is the secret value of the gateway GW, which cannot be known by the U A . Therefore, the smart card stolen attack can be resisted by the proposed solution.
M. RESIST TO THE RANDOM NUMBER LEAKAGE ATTACK
(1) In the C. HEALTH PROFESSIONAL LOGIN PHASE stage of the paper, after the user U i is confirmed as a legitimate user by the SC, the SC generates a random value K i , which is used for calculation
Furthermore Message M 1 is transmitted to the gateway node over a common channel. The attacker U A wants to fake a legitimate user and obtain the leaked random value K i . M 1 which is obtained by interception. Nevertheless M 1 is the encrypted cipher text, besides the secret key is X GWN −U = h(ID i X GWN ), where X GWN is the gateway GW. The secret value, the U A cannot be obtained, therefore the V i cannot be obtained correctly, which causes the GW to fail the verification of its legality. Therefore, the solution proposed in this paper does not have the security risk caused by the random value leakage.
(2) In the D. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREE-MENT PHASE of the paper, after the gateway GW is confirmed by the medical sensor node S n ,. A random value is generated by S n which is used to calculate the session key SK = h(ID i SID j K i K j N i ) in the subsequent process. It's assumed that the leaked random value K j is obtained by the attacker U A . If the U A wants to obtain SK, ID i , SID j ,in addition N i are needed. It is obvious that the values of these three parameters are unknown, therefore the security of the solution proposed in this paper is not affected by random value leaks.
V. SECURE FUNCTIONALITY AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS
In this section, the security features, computational overhead and communication overhead of the proposed scheme are compared with the state-of-the-arts schemes [5] , [7] , [8] , [2] , [13] . The specific results of these three aspects will be Introduced one by one below.
A. COMPARISON OF SECURITY FUNCTIONAL FEATURES
The secure functionality of different schemes is listed in Table 2 , it can be observed that the proposed scheme is more secure than four related schemes [2] , [5] , [7] , [8] , [13] . As is shown in Table 2 , the proposed scheme resists to biometric recognition error and replays attack. Besides time synchronization is needed and user anonymity is provided. Furthermore, common attacks can be withstanded by the proposed scheme. All schemes [2] , [5] , [7] , [8] , [13] can't consider the time synchronization problem. User anonymity can't be provided by the schemes [5] , [7] , [13] . Further, the schemes [7] , [13] neither resist impersonation attack nor consider the time synchronization problem.
B. COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
To evaluate the performance of different scheme, these notations are defined as follows: 
FIGURE 8. Computation costs comparison.
T h : is the time cost for secure one-way hash operation. T ed : is the time cost for encryption/decryption operation. T ecc : is the time cost for an elliptic curve cryptography operation.
In addition, the scheme [21] has shown that T ecc >> T ed >> T h . That T h , T ed and T ecc are 0.0005s, 0.0087s and 0.0621s respectively through the scheme [22] also can be known. The XOR operation is neglected in the proposed, because its complexity is far lower than those of other three operations. Furthermore, for the login and authentication phase is the most frequent process in a user authentication scheme. Thus, only the computation cost of this phase is considered in the comparisons. The computational costs comparisons of the proposed scheme with the related schemes [5] , [7] , [8] , [2] , [13] are listed in Table 3 .
As is shown in Table 3 , it indicates that computational cost of the proposed scheme is 0.0428s and is the lowest in the all comparative schemes [5] , [7] , [8] , [2] , [13] . The visual comparison results are shown in Figure 8 . From FIGURE 8, it can be intuitively seen that the computational cost of the proposed scheme is the least, which is very consistent with the resource-constrained characteristics of the WMSN node.
C. COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION COSTS
In Table 4 , the communication cost of the proposed scheme with other related schemes [5] , [7] , [8] , [2] , [13] is presented by us. The consequence of the communication cost is based on the number of messages and the required bandwidth during the login and authentication phases. It is well known that the output of hash function h(.) includes 160 bits. The timestamp is 32 bits, the random value and response value are both 160 bits, the identity is 160 bits. A point on the ECC needs 320 bits and the symmetric encryption/decryption is 128 bits according to reference [23] , reference [24] and reference [25] respectively. VOLUME 7, 2019 From Table 4 and FIGURE 9, the proposed scheme require communication cost 1056 bits, whereas the communication cost of 1664bits, 480bits, 608bits, 768bits and 1952 bits, are needed by Yeh et al. [5] , Kumar et al. [7] , He et al. [8] , Li et al. [3] and Park et al. [13] respectively. It is known from Table 4 that these schemes [7] , [8] , [3] require less communication for the proposed scheme. However, it can be seen in security and functional feature section that those schemes [7] , [8] , [3] do not resist various secure attacks. In a word, it is reasonable to pay some extra cost for higher security. Thus, the proposed scheme is better and suitable than the other schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, to overcome the existing security flaws, the biometric feature is introduced as the third authentication factor. In addition an improved authentication scheme is presented for health-care application using WMSN. It is shown in security analysis that the proposed scheme can withstand various attacks. Furthermore, the computation cost and communication cost of the proposed scheme is analyzed. Besides it is compared to the state-of-the-arts schemes. It is shown in the comparison results that the computation cost of the proposed scheme is the lowest in all comparative schemes. Therefore, the proposed scheme is more suitable for health-care application based on WMSN.
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